

13 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: NPIC Survey
Specific: Evidence Supporting Our Conclusion That NPIC
Has Not Been in on Development of New Systems

The following is a hasty compilation of evidence to support the conclusion in our report of survey of NPIC that NPIC has not been in on the planning of new collection systems--at least, not to the extent it should have been. Some of the sources are documentary; some of them come from notes of briefings by NPIC officers.

Documentary Sources

Memorandum from Lundahl to the DCI, dated 16 June 1965, subject: "Comments on Inspector General's Report of the Navy's Integrated Operational Intelligence Center"

"A major advantage the Navy had in developing its IOIC system was its control of the joint development of both the collection vehicle and the exploitation system required to handle inputs [redacted] Historically, NPIC has had little opportunity to affect the development of collection systems, and only occasionally has its advice been sought in these matters. Although NPIC strives to make itself heard, normally the basic parameters of a new system are established before NPIC is even aware of the system Some of our problems in dealing with the development of collection systems are treated in a separate paper together with recommended actions to improve this situation." (Comment: The reference is to the NPIC White Paper.)

Memorandum from the DD/I to the DCI, dated 17 June 1965, subject: "NPIC White Paper"

Recommendation No. 5d: "That means be developed for insuring that NPIC participate in the technical planning for and design of new reconnaissance systems in order to permit NPIC to conduct its exploitation planning and operations more effectively."

The NPIC White Paper

"(NPIC) has had no control over the collection resources so that they might be tailored to enhance and speed up the exploitation process."

" . . . there are nonetheless many problems remaining and among them, one which looms large is the issue of coordination of collection and exploitation in both the planning and execution phases."

From written briefing materials furnished the inspection team by the Chief, Plans and Development Staff



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Human Sources

From notes of briefing by Lundahl on 25 February

"Lundahl has no mandate to control or monitor R&S in the military services. Learns of developments only informally. Sometimes discover what is being developed very late in the game. NPIC is officially informed of perhaps 75% of the systems and equipment being developed. Whatever NPIC learns about the rest is only by chance.

From notes of briefing by Lundahl on 15 April

"Systems through KH-4 were strongly influenced by Bissell. Battle between DoD and CIA to retain or wrest control of collection resources. When Bissell and Charyk left, the paths began to separate."

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Notes from briefing by [redacted], Chief, and [redacted]
Deputy Chief, Plans and Development Staff

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[redacted] Cannot sit and
wait for the information to come to NPIC. NPIC has to go around
and beat the bushes. The drill is to find out who is working
on a project, get the clearances, and then go out and try to
see those involved."

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"Plans Branch spends much of its time on the road trying to
ferret out what is being done elsewhere."

[redacted]

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"Trying to make NPIC the repository for all information on
reconnaissance systems. Only getting off the ground."

[redacted]

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"There are only 4 people in NPIC with across-the-board clearances
for all NRO systems: Lundahl, [redacted] the Chief of the Plans
Branch, and the NPIC Liaison Officer to NRO."

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Notes of briefing by [redacted] Chief, and [redacted] Deputy
Chief, Technical Intelligence Division

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"KH-7 is an excellent example of now not to develop a system.
It was two years in development. [redacted]

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[redacted]
"TID has fairly close relationships with NRO, but have to keep
working at it. KH-7 was developed by the Air Force and preceded
NRO."

From notes of briefing by [redacted] Chief, Technical Analysis
Branch, Technical Intelligence Division

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"KH-7 was about ready to launch before the exploiters even
heard of the system."

"The binary data blocks are different for virtually every system.
TAB is trying to develop equipment to cope with all of them.
Had never even seen the data block used by the Navy [redacted]
and couldn't read it when the first photography arrived in NPIC."

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